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THE STANDARDS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
IN A NUTSHELL*
William H. Erickson**
England has been blessed with one court system. The English
barrister is burdened with only one set of procedures, and the
substantive law is uniform throughout the British Empire.
In the United States, we have our English common law
heritage complicated by many different procedures. Moreover,
variations exist in the substantive law of our fifty states and in
the federal law announced in our eleven federal judicial circuits.
In the last decade, the federal courts have reviewed state
criminal law and procedure to determine whether state criminal
practices and procedures measured up to federal constitutional
standards. In many instances, the federal courts have declared
that the constitutional right in issue was enforceable against the
state through the fourteenth amendment.'
On March 11, 1971, the President and the Chief Justice
of the United States presented historic addresses at The First
Conference of the Judiciary at Williamsburg, Virginia. President
Nixon said:
"We all know how urgent the need is for that improve-
Adapted from an address delivered by Justice Erickson at the National
Judicial Conference on Standards for the Administration of Criminal Justice,
Louisiana State University Law Center, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, February
11, 1972. This publication is made possible by a grant from the Criminal
Justice Program, Louisiana State University Law School.
** Associate Justice, Supreme Court of Colorado; Chairman, ABA Sec-
tion of Criminal Law.
1. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV. Bee, e.g.,
a. Right to Counsel: Doughty v. Maxwell, 376 U.S. 202 (1964) (holding
that the right to counsel is retroactive in its application); Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
b. Privilege against Self-incrimination: Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966); Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52 (1964); Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). See also Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
c. Search and Seizure: Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965)
(which denied retroactivity to the Mapp decision); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961).
d. Trial by Jury: Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970); Duncan
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
e. Double Jeopardy: Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970); Benton
v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
f. Speedy Trial; Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
Bee also L. HALL, Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL
PR cmuRE ch. 1 (3d ed. 1969); Friendly, The Bil of Rights as a Code of
Criminal Procedure, 53 CAuF. L. REV. 929 (1965).
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ment at both the State and Federal level. Interminable de-
lays in civil cases; unconscionable delays in criminal cases;
a steadily growing backlog of work that threatens to make
the delays worse tomorrow than they are today-all this
concerns everyone who wants to see justice done.
"Overcrowded penal institutions; unremitting pressure
on judges and prosecutors to process cases by plea bargain-
ing, without the safeguards recently set forth by the Amer-
ican Bar Association; the clogging of court calendars with
inappropriate or relatively unimportant matters-all this
sends everyone in the system of justice home at night feeling
as if they have been trying to brush back a flood with a
broom.
"Many hardworking, dedicated judges, lawyers, penolo-
gists and law enforcement officials are coming to this con-
clusion: A system of criminal justice that can guarantee
neither a speedy trial nor a safe community cannot excuse
its failure by pointing to an elaborate system of safeguards
for the accused. Justice dictates not only that the innocent
man go free, but that the guilty be punished for his crimes.
"When the average citizen comes into court as a party or
a witness, and he sees that court bogged down and unable
to function effectively, he wonders how this was permitted
to happen. Who is to blame? Members of the bench and
the bar are not alone responsible for the congestion of justice.
"The Nation has turned increasingly to the courts to
cure deep-seated ills of our society-and the courts have
responded; as a result, they have burdens unknown to the
legal system a generation ago. In addition, the courts had
to bear the brunt of the rise in crime-almost 150% higher
in one decade, an explosion unparalleled in our history."
His remarks were followed by a warning from Chief Justice
Warren E. Burger that was in parallel form to the President's
clarion call for improvement. The Chief Justice said:
"Today the American system of criminal justice in every
phase-the police function, the prosecution and defense,
the courts and the correctional machinery-is suffering from
a severe case of deferred maintenance. By and large, this
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is true at the state, local and federal levels. This failure of
our machinery is now a matter of common knowledge, fully
documented by innumerable studies and surveys.
"As a consequence of this deferred maintenance we see
"First, that the perpetrators of most criminal acts are
not detected, arrested and brought to trial;
"Second, those who are apprehended, arrested and
charged are not tried promptly because we allow uncon-
scionable delays that pervert both the right of the defendant
and the public to a speedy trial of every criminal charge;
and
"Third, the convicted persons are not punished promptly
after conviction because of delay in the appellate process.
Finally, even after the end of litigation, those who are
sentenced to confinement are not corrected or rehabilitated,
and the majority of them return to commit new crimes.
The primary responsibility of judges, of course, is for the
operation of the judicial machinery but this does not mean
they can ignore the police function or the shortcomings of
the correctional systems.
"At each of these three stages-the enforcement, the
trial, the correction-the deferred maintenance became ap-
parent when the machinery was forced to carry too heavy a
load. This is the thing that happens to any machinery
whether it is an industrial plant, an automobile or a dish-
washer. It can be no comfort to us that this deferred main-
tenance crisis is shared by others; by cities and in housing,
in the field of medical care, in environmental protection,
and many other fields. All of these problems are important,
but the administration of justice is the adhesive-the very
glue-that keeps the parts of an organized society from
flying apart. Man can tolerate many shortcomings of his
existence, but history teaches us that great societies have
foundered for want of an adequate system of justice, and
by that I mean justice in its broadest sense."
The need for reform in the criminal law field caused the
American Bar Association, at the instance of the Institute of
Judicial Administration at New York University, to accept the
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challenge of preparing a set of standards of criminal justice
relating to the proper method of handling a criminal case. The
Standards were prepared for use in fifty states and in our federal
courts. The objectives of the Standards are to promote effective
law enforcement and the adequate protection of the public and
to safeguard and amplify the constitutional rights of those
accused of the commission of crimes.
Seventeen Standards have been prepared which provide
guidance at each stage of criminal proceedings. The Standards
begin with the police function and end with the last post-
conviction proceeding. The Standards were prepared by the
leading professors, lawyers, and judges in the United States.
When the project commenced, Chief Judge Edward Lumbard of
the Second Circuit accepted the responsibility for overseeing
the entire project. He relinquished his position to then United
States Circuit Judge Warren E. Burger of the District of Colum-
bia, after serving with distinction from 1964-1968. When Warren
Burger became our Chief Justice, the project was assigned to
William Jameson, Senior United States District Judge from Mon-
tana, who was a former President of the American Bar Associa-
tion. Judge Jameson has caused the Standards project to be
completed and has assisted materially in the implementation
of the Standards.
Today, all but two of the Standards are complete. The two
Standards that have yet to be finalized are those dealing with
the Urban Police Function and the Function of the Trial Judge.
The fifteen Standards that have been approved and which are
all interrelated bear the following titles:
Providing Defense Services
Pretrial Release
Fair Trial and Free Press
Electronic Surveillance
Discovery and Procedure Before Trial
Pleas of Guilty
Joinder and Severance
Speedy Trial
Trial by Jury
Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures
Probation
Criminal Appeals
[Vol. 32
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Appellate Review of Sentences
Post-Conviction Remedies
The Prosecution Function and the Defense Function
Following the preparation of the Standards, it became
necessary to see that the Standards were implemented in every
state and put to use. Implementation of all of the Standards,
except Fair Trial and Free Press, 2 has been entrusted to the
Criminal Law Section of the American Bar Association. Retired
United States Supreme Court Justice Tom C. Clark heads the
Implementation Committee. Pilot Projects were undertaken in
Arizona, Florida, and Texas. Arizona was selected because it
was a rule-making state, and rules have now been prepared,
at the instance of the supreme court, that will cause the
Standards to be the law of Arizona. Florida served as a pilot
state because its procedures are dependent upon both statute
and rule. The Supreme Court of Florida implemented the
Standards by rule and directed that legislation be enacted to
complete the project. Texas, the last of the pilot states, was
compelled to implement the Standards through legislation. Hope-
fully, the legislature will complete the project in Texas at a
very early time.
In order to properly implement the Standards, it was neces-
sary for comparative studies to be made to determine how the
law of the particular state in question compared with the
Standards. Arizona, with the assistance of its two law schools,3
compared the Arizona law with the Standards, the federal law,
and the federal rules; made suggested comments; and offered
a proposed rule. Comparative analyses are being prepared or
have been completed in Colorado, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Arkan-
sas, Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska, Illinois, Washington, New
York, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and Georgia. Conferences
to introduce the Standards have also been held, not only in the
pilot states, but in nearly all of the states where a comparative
analysis was undertaken.
In 1969, the Tenth Circuit directed its entire attention at
2. Responsibility lies with a special committee which was first headed
by Paul C. Reardon of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts and now
is under the chairmanship of Judge John Gibbons of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
3. Arizona University and Arizona State University.
1972]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
its Judicial Conference to the Standards of Criminal Justice.4
Through the Criminal Law Section and the Section of Judicial
Administration of the American Bar Association, as well as the
Appellate Judges Conference, a National Judicial Conference
on Standards for the Administration of Criminal Justice, de-
signed to inform all appellate judges of the importance of the
Standards in their practice, has been held at Louisiana State
University at Baton Rouge, with more than three hundred
appellate judges in attendance. The Standards have been widely
cited in nearly all of our appellate courts. Moreover, the black-
letter declarations which comprise the Standards, with abridged
commentaries, will soon be published in one volume to facili-
tate reference to the entire set of interrelated Standards. Once
the Standards have been published in that form, Shepard's
Citations, Inc., plans to provide the citator service for the Stan-
dards. The West Publishing Company has also agreed to in-
clude the Standards in its key number classification to assist
lawyers and judges in obtaining ready access to the Standards.
In addition, Professor Paul Wilson of the University of Kansas
Law School has formulated a model set of rules as guidelines
for appellate courts that have the rule-making power.
In a legal sense, tomorrow's law in the criminal law field
should be hinged to the Standards. The seventeen Standards
contain not only black-letter statements, but commentaries that
supply all the existing law on the subject in issue. The Standards
are an ideal desk book and are being looked to more and more
by those who practice in the criminal law field. In a nutshell,
the Standards are capsulated in this article.
PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES
The Standards Relating to Providing Defense Services are
based on the concept that an adversary proceeding will not work
at its best unless both the defendant and the prosecution are
represented by competent counsel.5 In addition, the Standards
4. Proceedings at the 1969 Judicial Conference for the Tenth Circuit,
49 F.R.D. 347 (1969).
5. See ABA PROJEur OF MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STAN-
DARDS RELATING TO PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES § 1.1 (app. draft 1968) [herein-
after cited as DEFENSE SERVICES]. See also McDonald v. State, 459 S.W.2d
806 (Ark. 1970), in which the court cites § 1.2 relating to methods of pro-
viding defense services.
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adopt the position that provision must be made for investigatory,
expert, and other supporting services necessary to an adequate
defense.0
Access to counsel is declared to be a right of the criminally
accused at every stage of the proceeding, beginning with petrial
proceedings and continuing through post-conviction proceedings.,
In general, counsel should be provided in all cases where loss of
liberty may occur, including civil cases where mental com-
petency is in issue.3
In looking to a basis for providing assistance of counsel,
the draftsmen refused to require poverty as a sine qua non to
the appointment of a lawyer to represent a defendant who is
accused of a crime that could deprive him of his liberty. Instead,
substantial hardship to the family was established as the criterion
upon which counsel would be assigned.9 In accordance with this
proposal, the defendant should contribute that portion of the
attorney's fee which he can afford.
The controversial question of public defender versus the
appointive system is not solved by the Standards; however,
the Standards do require that the public defender's office be
insulated from political influence in the selection of its staff.',
To the joy of all those who serve in states where the indigent
obtain counsel through court appointment, the Standards sug-
6. DEFENSE SERVICES § 1.5; see United States v. Taylor, 437 F.2d 371, 377
(4th Cir. 1971). see also People v. Watson, 36 Il.2d 228, 221 N.E.2d 645
(1966).
7. DEFENSE SERVICES § 4.1. These provisions give full recognition to the
right to counsel provided in Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969) (in prison);
Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967) (at probation violation hearing); In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (in juvenile proceedings); Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966) (at police station or while in custody); White v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 59 (1963) (at preliminary hearing); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963) (at trial); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (on appeal).
A recent case which involves the issue of whether a defendant is entitled
to court-appointed counsel for offenses with maximum penalties of six
months' imprisonment is now before the United States Supreme Court on
reargument. State of Florida ex rel. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 92 S. Ct. 566
(1971).
See generally Phillips v. North Carolina, 433 F.2d 659, 662 (4th Cir. 1970);
United States ex rel. Miner v. Ericksen, 428 F.2d 623, 635 (8th Cir. 1970)
(waiver of counsel, § 7.2); State v. Johnson, 50 Wis.2d 280, 184 N.W.2d 107,
110 (1971) (withdrawal of counsel, § 5.3).
8. DEFENSE SERVICES § 4.2. For cases citing this provision, see United
States ex rel. Bey v. Connecticut State Board of Parole, 443 F.2d 1079, 1085
(2d Cir. 1971); Bearden v. South Carolina, 443 F.2d 1090, 1099 (4th Cir. 1971).
9. DEFENSE SERVICES § 6.1. See Commonwealth v. Janoff, 215 Pa. Super.
160, 256 A.2d 874 (1969) (dissenting opinion).
10. DEFENSE SERVICES § 3.1.
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gest that court-appointed counsel receive reasonable compen-
sation."'
PRETRIAL RELEASE
The Standards Relating to Pretrial Release incorporate the
best features of the Manhattan Bail Project 12 and the Federal
Bail Reform Act of 1966.13 The old and time-worn theory that
the risk of financial loss to a defendant is necessary to insure
against flight to avoid prosecution is rejected in the Standards
as being unsound.' 4 Because monetary bail inevitably discrimi-
nates against the poor,' 5 the Standards recommend its use only
as a last resort.16 Whenever possible, the Standards recommend
that a summons or citation be issued to avoid the necessity of
arrest, embarassment to the accused, and the expense of in-
carceration, both to society and to the accused. 17 Release on
personal recognizance is also recommended favorably1S
The lawyer for the accused has a heavy duty under the
Standards to secure all the relevant facts regarding the accused
which will establish that the risk of flight is minimal and that
the accused is entitled to release on bail.19 The basis for release
remains relatively unchanged, inasmuch as the Standards suggest
that the court be supplied with information relating to the
nature of the offense charged, the character of the defendant,
11. Id. § 2.4.
12. Ares, Rankin & Sturz, The Manhattan Bail Project: An Interim
Report on the Use of Pre-Trial Parole, 38 N.Y.U. L. REv. 67 (1963).
13. 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (1970).
14. See J. FREED & P. WALD, BAIL IN THE UNITED STATES 62 (prepared as a
working paper for the National Conference on Bail and Criminal Justice in
Washington D.C., 1964); R MOLLEUR, BAIL REFORM IN THE NATION'S CAPITOL
31 (1966).
15. Ares, Rankin & Sturz, The Manhattan Bail Project: An Interim
Report on the Use of Pre-Trial Parole, 38 N.Y.U. L. REv. 67, 79 (1963); Bail
System of the District of Columbia 2 (1963); Report of the Attorney Gen-
eral's Committee on Poverty and the Administration of Federal Criminal
Justice 66 (1963); see Foote, The Administration of Bail in New York City,
106 U. PA. L. REv. 693 (1958).
16. ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS
RELATING TO PRETRIAL RELEASE §§ 1.2(c), 5.3 (app. draft 1968) [hereinafter
cited as PRETRIAL RELEASE]. Pressley v. Lucas, 30 Mich.App. 300, 186 N.W.2d
412, 415 (1971); Commonwealth ex rel. Hartage v. Hendrick, 439 Pa. 584,
268 A.2d 451, 453, 457-58 (1970).
17. PRETRIAL RELEASE §§ 2.1, 3.1.
18. Id. §§ 1.2(a), 5.1.
19. The accused should also be assured a prompt appearance before a
judicial officer. See, e.g., Fulks v. State, 262 N.E.2d 651, 65960 (Ind. 1970),
citing §§ 4.1-4.3 of PRETRIAL RELEASE.
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his ties with the community, his financial ability, and the likeli-
hood that he will appear for trial.0
The question of whether preventive detention should be
permitted caused the committee formulating the Standards to
have serious misgivings. Given that the purpose of bail is to
insure the defendant's presence at the time of trial,21 the com-
mittee cast aside preventive detention and chose conditional
release as an alternative.2 2 The conditions which the court can
impose upon release are such that the public, the community,
and the defendant's rights can be adequately protected.
Because pretrial release is a function of committing magis-
trates and trial judges whose actions often go unreported, the
impact of the Standards to date is largely unknown. The Stan-
dards have been cited in Colorado25 and trial judges in that
state are now on notice that the Standards should be considered
and followed in making all release decisions.
FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS
The Standards Relating to Fair Trial and Free Press24 are
an outgrowth of a series of cases in which the United States
Supreme Court held that a defendant had been denied a fair
trial because of accusatorial and prejudicial newspaper pub-
licity.25 The Kennedy assassination highlighted the need for
standards when the news media met the public demand for
information by widespread dissemination of information that
was, in many respects, inaccurate. 26  Many state and federal
courts reviewed the problem with widely different results before
Sheppard v. Maxwell27 was announced.
20. PRETRIAL RELEASE §§ 4.5(d), 5.1(b), 5.3(d).
21. Gusick v. Boles, 72 Ariz. 233, 233 P.2d 446 (1957); see generaIhy
J. FnIED & P. WALD, BAIL IN THE UNITED STATES 108 (prepared as a working
paper for the National Conference on Bail and Criminal Justice in Washing-
ton D.C., 1964); of. Mastrian v. Hedman, 326 F.2d 708, 711 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 376 U.S. 965 (1964).
22. PRETRIAL RELEASE §H 5.5-5.9.
23. People v. Jones, 489 P.2d 596, 598, 600 (Colo. 1971).
24. These Standards are popularly known as "The Reardon Report." See,
e.g., People v. Quinlan, 8 Cal. App. 3d 1063, 88 Cal. Rptr. 125, 129 (1970).
25. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S.
532 (1965); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S.
717 (1961); Janko v. United States, 366 U.S. 716 (1961); Marshall v. United
States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959).
26. Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of Presi-
dent Kennedy (1964).
27. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
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In an effort to resolve the conflict between the right to a
fair trial and the first amendment's guarantee of a free press,
standards of conduct were formulated for lawyers, as well as
court and law enforcement personnel.28 These Standards specify
types of prejudicial information which lawyers participating in
a case should not release.29 They also encourage court and law
enforcement personnel to follow similar rules designed to avoid
prejudice to those accused of crime.80
To safeguard the rights of a free press, the Standards pro-
vide for the prompt release from official sources of basic facts
about crimes committed and the circumstances surrounding
them.8 1 In addition, they impose no real restriction upon the
freedom of the media to publish whatever information they are
able to obtain through their own initiative.
Besides the recommendation relating to the conduct of the
participants in the criminal process, the Standards also provide
guidelines for the conduct of judicial proceedings in criminal
cases. For example, in all pretrial hearings the defendant may
move, in a proper case, that the public be excluded on the ground
that dissemination of evidence or argument may disclose prej-
udicial matters that will be inadmissible at trial.82 The defendant
may also obtain a change of venue whenever it is determined
that because of the publication of potentially prejudicial ma-
terial there is a reasonable likelihood that, absent such relief,
a fair trial cannot be had.33 Provisions relating to waiver of
jury,3 4 selection of jury,3 5 use of the courtroom, 36 and seques-
28. See generally H. MEDINA, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND FAIR TRIAL (Final
Report with Recommendations from the Association of the Bar of the City
of New York, Special Committee on Radio, Television, and the Administra-
tion of Justice, 1967); FREE PRESS AND FAIR TRIAL (American Newspaper Pub-
lishers Association, Special Committee on Free Press and Fair Trial, 1967);
A. FRIENDLY & R. GOLDFARB, CRIME AND PUBLICITY (1967).
29. ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS
RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS § 1.1 (app. draft 1968) [hereinafter
cited as FAIR TRIAL].
30. Id. § 2.1.
31. Id. §§ 1.1, 2.1.
32. Id. § 3.1.
33. Id. § 3.2. See People v. Quinlan, 8 Cal. App. 3d 1063, 1069, 88 Cal. Rptr.
125, 129 (1970), citing § 3.2(c), and State v. Clarke, 49 Wis.2d 161, 167, 181
N.W.2d 355, 358 (1970).
34. FAIR TRIAL § 3.3.
35. Id. § 3.4. See Napier v. State, 266 N.E.2d 199, 208-09 (Ind. 1971)
36. FAIR TRIAL § 3.5(a).
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tration of the jury37 are likewise included to assure the defen-
dant relief from an unfair trial. Compliance with the afore-
mentioned safeguards notwithstanding, the defendant may still
have the verdict set aside if the court finds a substantial likeli-
hood that the vote of one or more jurors was influenced by ex-
posure to an extra-judicial communication.38
To enforce the guidelines prescribed, the Standards authorize
suspension and disbarment of lawyers 9 and limited use of the
contempt power.40 The American Bar Association Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility also specifically denominates a breach
of the Standards to be unprofessional conduct.4 1 In many in-
stances, the guidelines provided by the Standards have been
met by compacts of understanding between the fourth estate
and the bar, which make both professions assume responsibility
37. Id. § 3.5(b). See also Napier v. State, 266 N.E.2d 199, 208-09 (Ind.
1971), citing § 3.5(f).
38. FAIR TRIAL § 3.6.
39. Id. § 1.3.
40. Id. § 4.1.
41. On August 14, 1964, the House of Delegates, at the request of then
President (now Justice) Lewis F. Powell, Jr., created the Special Committee
on Evaluation of Ethical Standards. To the extent that the Standards on
Fair Trial and Free Press refer to the conduct of attorneys, they have
been incorporated in the new Code of Professional Responsibility; spe-
cifically, Disciplinary Rule 7-107 (which replaces former Canon 20). Imple-
mentation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, since it was approved
by the House of Delegates on August 12, 1969, has been widespread. It has
been adopted in the District of Columbia and in thirty-nine states: Alaska,
Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wis-
consin. In eight other states (Connecticut, Massachusetts, Montana, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming), the state bar
association has approved the Code and transmitted it to the highest court
with a recommendation for adoption.
Moreover, the desirability of having substantially uniform fair trial-
free press procedures in both state and federal courts was recognized in the
report of a Special Committee of the Judicial Conference of the United
States which developed guidelines for the federal court system. The federal
standards were adopted by the Judicial Conference on September 19, 1968,
and they have been widely implemented through rules adopted in the United
States District Courts. The Special Committee of the Judicial Conference
was under the Chairmanship of Judge Irving R. Kaufman of the Second
Circuit. His report pointed out that lawyers and court personnel have been
"one of the chief sources of prejudicial publicity," that "unquestionably the
courts have the power to regulate this particular source of Information, and
there now seems to be general agreement that they have the duty to do so."
Report of the Committee of the Operation of the Jury System on the "Free
Press--Fair Trial" Issue, 45 F.R.D. 391, 406 (1969). As they apply to lawyers
and court personnel, the federal court standards incorporated the American
Bar Association Standards in full, and In identical language.
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for insuring that a defendant does not have his trial contaminated
by improvident news releases.
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
The Standards Relating to Electronic Surveillance represent
a comprehensive proposal designed to insure the maintenance
of privacy and the promotion of justice.42 The need for guide-
lines in the area was highlighted by The Report of the President's
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Juctice,
which concluded: "The present status of law [relating to elec-
tronic surveillance] is intolerable. It serves the interests neither
of privacy nor of law enforcement." 43
This judgment was reached in 1967. Since that date, the
United States Supreme Court has established constitutional
standards for the use of electronic surveillance by law enforce-
ment officers,44 and the Congress has enacted comprehensive
legislation dealing with wiretapping, bugging, and other forms
of electronic surveillance by private individuals and law enforce-
ment officers.45
Today, a number of states have followed the congressional
invitation and enacted comprehensive legislation in the area.4
In those remaining states which have either taken no action or
must reconsider their previous legislation in light of the con-
stitutional requirements which have been established, these Stan-
dards are of prime relevancy.
The objective of the Standards is to prohibit private elec-
tronic surveillance and to subject electronic surveillance by
public law enforcement personnel to strict limitations.4' To
effect these objectives, the Standards include both criminal" and
42. ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS
RELATING TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE § 1.1(a) (app. draft 1971) [hereinafter
cited as ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE].
43. THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN" A FREE SOCIETY 203 (a report from the
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice,
1967).
44. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). See also Lee v.
Florida, 892 U.S. 878 (1968).
45. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 tit. III, 18
U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1971).
46. As of May 1971, the following states had enacted comprehensive
legislation in accordance with Title III and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41
(1967): Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Kansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island,
South Dakota, Washington, and Wisconsin.
47. ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE § 1.1(b), (c).
48. Id. § 2.1.
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civil sanctions.49 In addition, the Standards recommend sup-
pression of oral communications obtained illegally by law en-
forcement officials.50
In the area of national security, federal use of electronic
surveillance is under the supervision of the executive and legis-
lative branches of the government, 51 and the evidence obtained
thereby is admissible in court where the overhearing or record-
ing was reasonable. 52
Use of electronic surveillance techniques by law enforce-
ment officers with the consent of one of the parties to the com-
munication should be permitted.5 3 Use of electronic surveillance
by law enforcement officers without consent requires prior ju-
dicial approval,54 except in emergency situations, where approval
may be obtained after the fact.55 In order to obtain judicial
approval for electronic surveillance, law enforcement officers are
required to submit an application containing facts analogous to
those which must be shown in order to obtain a search warrant.5
Because of the magnitude of the invasion of privacy occasioned
by electronic surveillance, the officers seeking an order approv-
ing the use of such techniques must establish that other investi-
gative procedures will not succeed. 57
Where a communication relating to an offense other than
the offense under investigation is overheard or recorded, its use
or disclosure is permitted,58 subject to the same procedural safe-
guards which are generally required to provide an adequate
record for appellate court review.59
DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURE BEroRE TRIAL
The Standards Relating to Discovery and Procedure Before
Trial are designed for serious criminal cases e0 They propose
49. Id. § 2.2.
50. Id. § 2.3.
51. Id. § 3.1.
52. Id. § 3.2.
53. Id. § 4.1. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 753, 762, 771, 790
(1971), for citation to § 4.1 in both the majority and dissenting opinions.
54. ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE § 5.1.
55. Id. § 5.2.
56. See 4d. §§ 5.3, 5.4.
57. Id. § 5.4 (ii).
58. Id. § 5.6.
59. Id. §§ 5.2, 5.3.
60. ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS
RELATING TO DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL § 1.5 (app.draft 1970)
[hereinafter cited as DISCOVERY].
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more permissive discovery practices for criminal cases than are
provided by applicable law in any jurisdiction in the United
States. They also propose a procedure prior to trial which is
intended not only to accommodate such discovery, but also to
correct certain general dissatisfactions with criminal litigation.
The discovery provided for is premised on the view that
broad disclosure of the prosecution's case is the best method to
assure that the disposition of a criminal case is final. The Stan-
dards should expedite and simplify the discovery process and
should shorten trials.61 The discovery proposed is, in large
measure, an outgrowth of recent developments which have sig-
nificantly expanded federal criminal discovery. 2
The Standards require the prosecution to take the initiative
in furnishing defense counsel with such things as lists of wit-
nesses and their statements, statements of the accused or his
co-defendant, relevant portions of grand jury minutes, reports
of experts, and real evidence. 8 The prosecution is not required
to disclose its working papers or work product, identity of in-
formants where irrelevant to the issues, or material involving
a substantial risk of grave prejudice to the national security.64
The Standards have also caused reciprocal discovery to come of
age. The defense is required to make certain disclosures,
including non-testimonial disclosures by the defendant and the
disclosure of experts' reports which are not constitutionally pro-
tected.6 5 Both sides have the continuing duty to disclose addi-
tional discoverable information as they learn of its existence.66
61. Id. § 1.2.
62. See Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66 (1967); Dennis v. United States,
384 U.S. 855 (1966); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Jencks v. United
States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957); FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 and 17.1; 18 U.S.C. § 3500(1970). See also Proceedings at the 1969 Judicial Conference-United States
Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit-Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice,
49 F.R.D. 347, 465-73 (1969).
63. DISCOVERY § 2.1. Numerous cases have cited this Standard, including;
United States v. Barson, 434 F.2d 127, 129 (5th Cir. 1970); State v. Smith,
482 P.2d 863, 869 (Ariz. 1971); Z. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
91 Cal. Rptr. 594, 478 P.2d 26, 30 (1970); State ex rel. Dooley v. Connall, 475
P.2d 582, 585-86 (Ore. 1970); Commonwealth v. Turra, 442 Pa. 192, 275 A.2d
96, 98 (1971); Okransinski v. State, 51 Wis.2d 210, 186 N.W.2d 314, 318 (1971).
64. DISCOVERY § 2.6. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), for a
definition of work product.
65. DISCOVERY §§ 3.1, 3.2. See also Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970),
requiring defendant to provide notice of alibi.
66. DISCOVERY § 4.2.
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The procedure prior to trial is organized into three succes-
sive stages: first, a period of inter-action between the prosecutor
and defense counsel, without court intervention; second, involve-
ment of the court in supervising discovery, and acting as a
catalyst to move the process along; and third, for those cases
which require it, planning for the anticipated trial.6 The novel
feature of this procedure is the second stage, or Omnibus Hear-
ing, so named because it is intended to serve as an all-purpose
hearing. One significant aspect of the Omnibus Hearing is the
use of a check-list to assure that all conceivable issues are ex-
posed and dealt with early in the process, rather than being
strung out by the filing of successive separate motions, briefs,
and responses." This use of a check-list is also of benefit to
assigned counsel whose practice is often not primarily in the
criminal law field.
The discovery and pretrial procedures proposed by these
Standards were first implemented on an experimental basis in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of
California in 1967 and in the Western District of Texas by Chief
Judge Adrian A. Spears. Judge Spears, in his utilization of the
Omnibus Hearing, through court rule, obtained results which
are highly favorable. Based upon the success of these experi-
ments, the Standards are rapidly being implemented in other
jurisdictions.6 9
PLEAS OF GUILTY
The Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty are proposed for
use in all serious criminal cases.70 They are based on the con-
clusion that disposition without trial should continue to be a
67. Id. § 5.1.
68. Id. § 5.3.
69. See Revelle & Ashbaugh, Criminal Pre-TriaZ Discovery-A Proposal,
3 GONZAGA L. REV. 48 (1968). For a critical review of the omnibus hearing
concept utilized in the San Diego Federal District Court, see Nimmer,
A Slightly Moveable Object: A Case Study in Judicial Reform in the Criminal
Justice Process-The Omnibus Hearing, 48 DENVER L.J. 179 (1972).
70. Procedural reform consistent with the Standards Is also urgently
needed in courts of limited jurisdiction. See Dash, Cracks in Foundation of
Criminal Justice, 46 ILL. L. REV. 385 (1951); Nutter, The Quality of Justice
in Misdemeanor Arraignment Courts, 53 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 215 (1962);
Note, Metropolitan Criminal Courts of First Instance, 70 HARv. L. REV. 320
(1956).
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frequent means for disposition of criminal cases.71 In conjunction
therewith, the Standards recognize the propriety of certain plea
agreements and reject the view that plea agreements are illicit
or, in the words of Thurman Arnold, "immoral, or at best a
necessary evil.' '72
Included within the Standards are procedures to govern
the informal process of plea negotiation73 and the formal process
by which a guilty plea is received and accepted in court.7 4 In
addition, the Standards deal with the timeliness of withdrawal
motions and the grounds which justify withdrawal of a plea of
guilty or nolo contendere.7 5
In the area of plea discussions and plea agreements, the
71. In some jurisdictions approximately 90 percent of the convictions
are obtained as the result of a guilty plea.
72. See Shelton v. United States, 242 F.2d 101 (5th Cir. 1957), in which
the validity of plea bargaining is questioned because of the failure to in-
corporate maximum safeguards. See generally Alsehuler, The Prosecutor's
Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHL L. REV. 50 (1968); 'White, A Proposal for
Reform of the Plea Bargaining Process, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 439 (1971); Note,
The Unconstitutionality of Plea Bargaining, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1387 (1970).
73. ABA PRoJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS
RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY § 3.1-3.4 (app. draft 1968) [hereinafter cited
as PLEAS oF GUILTY]. These Standards have been cited in Woodson v.
Brewer, 437 F.2d 1036, 1039 (8th Cir. 1971); Baily v. MacDougall, 392 F.2d
155 (4th Cir. 1968); Ganger v. Peyton, 379 F.2d 709, 712 (4th Cir. 1967);
Raleigh v. Coiner, 302 F. Supp. 1151, 1159-60 (N.D.W.Va. 1969); Semon v.
Turner, 289 F. Supp. 803, 806 (D. Utah 1968); People v. West, 91 Cal. Rptr.
385, 477 P.2d 409, 413 (1970); Beltowski v. State, 289 Minn. 215, 219, 183 N.W.2d
563, 565 (1971); State v. Wolske, 280 Minn. 465, 160 N.W.2d 146 (1968); State
v. Johnston, 279 Minn. 209, 156 N.W.2d 218 1968); State v. Pall, 112 N.J.
Super. 374, 271 A.2d 447, 450 (1970).
74. PLEAS OF GUILTY §§ 1.1-1.8. For cases citing these Standards, see
People v. Randolph, 488 P.2d 203 (Colo. 1971); State v. Sisco, 169 N.W.2d
542 (Iowa 1969); Black v. State, 289 Minn. 328, 352, 184 N.W.2d 419, 421 (1971);
State ex rel. Kons v. Tahash, 281 Minn. 467, 161 N.W.2d 826 (1968); State
v. Decker, 181 N.W.2d 746, 750 (N.D. 1970); Austin v. State, 50 Wis.2d 113,
183 N.W.2d 56, 57 (1971).
75. PLEAS oF GUILTY §H 2.1-2.2. For cases discussing these sections in
conjunction with withdrawal of pleas, see United States ex rel. Scott v.
Mancusi, 429 F.2d 104, 110 (2d Cir. 1970); People v. Riebe, 40 Ill.2d 565, 241
N.E.2d 313 (1968); People v. Walston, 38 Ill.2d 39, 230 (N.E.2d 233 (1967);
People v. Baron, 264 N.E.2d 423, 425 (Ill. App. 2d Dist. 1970); State v. Loyd,
190 N.W.2d 123 (Mich. 1971); People v. Palma, 25 Mich.App. 682, 181 N.W.2d
808, 810 (1970); Chapman v. State, 282 Minn. 13, 162 N.W.2d 698 (1968); State
v. Wolske, 280 Minn. 465, 160 N.W.2d 146 (1968); State v. Warren, 278 Minn.
190, 153 N.W.2d 273 (1967); Peters v. State, 50 Wis.2d 682, 184 N.W.2d 826,
828-29 (1971); State v. Froelich, 49 Wis.2d 551, 182 N.W.2d 267, 271 (1971);
Young v. State, 49 Wis.2d 361, 182 N.W.2d 262, 265 (1971); Belcher v. State,
42 Wis.2d 299, 166 N.W.2d 211, 217 (1969); State v. Draper, 41 Wis.2d 747, 165
N.W.2d 165, 168 (1969); Reiff v. State, 41 Wis.2d 369, 164 N.W.2d 249, 250
(1969); State v. Galvin, 40 Wis.2d 679, 162 N.W.2d 622, 624 (1968); LeFebre v.
State, 40 Wis.2d 666, 162 N.W.2d 544, 546 (1968); State v. Harrell, 40 Wis.2d
187, 161 N.W.2d 223, 226 (1968); Cresci v. State, 36 Wis.2d 287, 152 N.W.2d
893 (1967).
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Standards make the proceedings visible and subject to syste-
matic control.76 They also require equal plea agreement oppor-
tunities for defendants occupying similar positions, 7 and recom-
mend the use of plea discussions only in cases where the public
interest and the effective administration of justice will be
served.7 8 Furthermore, they provide guidelines for proper con-
duct in such proceedings on the part of defense counsel,79 prose-
cutors,8 and judges."'
To assure that a defendant's rights are protected in entering
a plea of guilty, the Standards incorporate all of the constitu-
tional requirements with regard to entering pleas of guilty
which have been set forth in recent decisions of the United
States Supreme Court. 2 The Standards require that the defen-
dant have the aid of counsel prior to the entry of the plea or, at
least, time for deliberation if he is without counsel. 83 The court
is required to advise the defendant of certain rights and certain
consequences of his plea,84 to determine the voluntariness of the
76. PLEAS or GuuATY § 1.5. See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 92 S. Ct. 495
(1971), in which the United States Supreme Court vacated a judgment and
sentence imposed as the result of a guilty plea that was induced by the
promise of a prosecutor which was later disavowed.
77. PLEAS or GUILTY § 3.1(c).
78. Id. §§ 1.8, 3.1(a). For cases citing § 3.1(a), see United States ex rel.
Scott v. Mancusi, 429 F.2d 104, 113 (2d Cir. 1970); United States ex rel. Brown
v. LaValle, 424 F.2d 457 (2d CIr. 1970); Meyer v. United States, 424 F.2d 1181,
1195-96 (8th Cir. 1970).
79. PLEAS or GuiLTY § 3.2, cited with approval, Bresnahan v. People, 487
P. 2d 551, 556 (Colo. 1971).
80. PLEAS or GUiLTY § 3.1(b).
81. Id. § 3.3. For citation to this section, see Brown v. Peyton, 435 F.2d
1352, 1356, 1359 (4th Cir. 1970); Raleigh v. Coiner, 302 F. Supp. 1151, 1159-60
(N.D. W.Va. 1969); People v. Brock, 45 I1l.2d 292, 259 N.E.2d 12, 14 (1970);
People v. Riebe, 40 Ill.2d 565, 241 N.E.2d 313 (1968); People v. Palma, 25
Mich.App. 682, 181 N.W.2d 808, 810 (1970); State v. Wolske, 280 Minn. 465,
160 N.W.2d 146 (1968); State v. Tyler, 440 S.W.2d 470 (Mo. 1969); Common-
wealth v. Evans, 434 Pa. 52, 252 A.2d 689 (1969); Farrar v. State, 191 N.W.2d
214, 216 (Wis. 1971); Rahal v. State, 52 Wls.2d 144, 187 N.W.2d 800- (1971);
State v. Wolfe, 46 Wis.2d 478, 487-89, 175 N.W.2d 216, 221 (1970).
82. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970); Parker v. North
Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970);
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238
(1969); McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969). See also Meyer v.
United States, 424 F.2d 1181 (8th Cir. 1970).
83. PLEAS or GUILTY § 1.3, cited in Grades v. Boles, 398 F.2d 409 (4th Cir.
1968).
84. PLEAS or GuiLTv § 1.4. For cases citing this section, see United
States v. Howard, 407 F.2d 1102 (4th Cir. 1969); People v. Flannigan, 267
N.E.2d 739 (Ill. App. 1971); People v. McCullough, 45 Ill.2d 305, 259 N.E.2d
19, 21-22 (1970); State v. Coe, 188 N.W.2d 421, 422 (Minn. 1971); State v. Judd,
277 Minn. 415, 152 N.W.2d 724 (1967); Wilson v. State, 456 S.W.2d 941, 944
(Tex. 1970); Ex parte Battenfield, 466 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. App. 1971); McBain
v. Maxwell, 2 Wash.App. 27, 466 P.2d 177 (1970).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
plea,85 and to enter judgment on the plea only when satisfied as
to its factual basis.8 6 A verbatim record of these proceedings is
required so that a reviewing court will have sufficient informa-
tion to determine whether the defendant's rights have been
protected.8
JOINDER AND SEVERANCE
The Standards Relating to Joinder and Severance deal with
the joinder and severance of offenses and defendants in criminal
cases. They were formulated to expedite the handling of criminal
cases without excessive demands on prosecutorial and judicial
resources and to protect defendants from the risk of prejudicial
and unfair treatment. The Standards continue to make joinder
and severance a matter of the court's discretion.18 However,
they provide more guidelines than rules 8, 13, and 14 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and they should be of in-
valuable assistance to the prosecution, the defense, and the trial
judge.
The Standards approve wide-open joinder and then recog-
nize the right to a severance when the defendant's rights to a
fair trial are jeopardized. For example, the Standards permit
the prosecutor to join in one-charge offenses of the same or
similar character, even though the offenses are not part of a
single scheme or plan.8 9 The defendant in such cases has an
85. PLEAS OF GUILTY § 1.5. See United States v. Williams, 407 F.2d 940,
948 (4th Cir. 1969); United States ex rel. Amuso v. LaVallee, 291 F. Supp.
383, 384 (E.D. N.Y. 1968); People v. West, 91 Cal. Rptr. 385, 477 P.2d 409, 413(1970); Moneyhun v. People, 486 P.2d 434 (Colo. 1971); State v. Coe, 188
N.W.2d 421, 422 (Minn. 1971); State v. Judd, 277 Minn. 415, 152 N.W.2d 724(1967); State v. Turner, 186 Neb. 424, 183 N.W.2d 763, 765 (1971); State v.
Tunender, 182 Neb. 701, 157 N.W.2d 165 (1968).
86. PLEAS OF GUILTY § 1.6. see Manley v. United States, 432 F.2d 1241,
1243 (2d Cir. 1970); Moneyhun v. People, 486 P.2d 434 (Colo. 1971); State
v. Coe, 188 N.W.2d 421, 422 (Minn. 1971); State ex rel. Kons v. Tahash, 281
Minn. 467, 161 N.W.2d 826 (1968); Edwards v. State, 51 Wis.2d 231, 186
N.W.2d 193, 195 (1971); State v. Reppin, 35 Wis.2d 377, 151 N.W.2d 9 (1967).
87. PLEAS OF GUILTY § 1.7; see People v. West, 91 Cal. Rptr. 385, 477 P.2d
409, 418 (1970).
88. Timeliness of a motion for severance, waiver of severance, and
problems related to double jeopardy are covered in ABA PROJECT ON MINI-
MUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO JOINDER AND
SEVERANCE § 2.1 (app. draft 1968) [hereinafter cited as JOINDER]. § 2.1 and the
commentary thereto was relied upon in United States ex rel. Tarallo v.
LaVallee, 433 F.2d 4, 6 (2d Cir. 1970).
89. JOINDER § 1.1(a). The commentary to this section was cited with
approval in United States v. Franklin, 452 F.2d 926 (8th Cir. 1971).
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absolute right to a severance of the offenses.0 Thus, the Stan-
dards permit the defendant to dispose of all charges in one trial
or to gamble on concurrent sentencing in the event of a con-
viction. The Standards also allow joinder when the offenses are
based on the same conduct or on a series of acts connected to-
gether or constituting part of a single scheme or plan.9 1 The
defendant does not incur a disadvantage because the "other
crimes" test would permit evidence in both trials. On the matter
of failure to join closely related offenses, the Standards conform
with-the Model Penal Code in the view that a defendant should
be protected against successive prosecutions for the same con-
duct.92
Severance focuses on the critical issue of whether the trier
of fact will be in a position to separate out the facts and the
law applicable to each count. Before trial, a severance is to be
granted when deemed appropriate to promote a fair determina-
tion of the defendant's guilt or innocence of each offense.9 3 Dur-
ing trial, a severance is called for when it is deemed necessary
to achieve a fair determination of the defendant's guilt or inno-
cence of each offense.9 4 A broad test is considered proper before
trial, when the decision must often be made by speculating on
what will occur during trial; a stricter test is appropriate when
the motion is based on events which have already occurred. The
motion, if granted, would require termination of a partially
completed trial.
If a defendant moves for severance at the conclusion of the
prosecution's case or of all the evidence, and there is not sufficient
evidence to support the allegations upon which the moving de-
fendant was joined for trial with the other defendant or defen-
dants, the court should grant a severance if, in view of this lack
of evidence, severance is deemed necessary to achieve a fair
determination of that defendant's guilt or innocence.95
With regard to the joinder and severance of defendants, the
90. JOINDER § 2.2(a).
91. Id. § 1.1(b).
92. Id. § 1.3. This section is comparable to ABA MODEL PENAL CoDn §
1.08, comment (Tent.Draft No. 5, 1956).
93. JOINDER § 2.2(b)(i).
94. Id. § 2.2(b)(ii).
95. Id. § 2.4.
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Standards follow the approach of the Federal Rules with changes
to avoid the difficulties which have been experienced in the
federal courts. The Standards permit joinder of defendants under
the following circumstances:
"(a) when each of the defendants is charged with ac-
countability for each offense included [e.g., A is charged
with burglary, B is charged with aiding and abetting that
burglary];
"(b) when each of the defendants is charged with
conspiracy and some of the defendants are also charged with
one or more offenses alleged to be in furtherance of the
conspiracy; or
"(c) when . . . it is alleged that the several offenses
charged:
(i) were part of a common scheme or plan [e.g.,
where, though no conspiracy count, A and B are charged
with filing a false form with respect to A's draft deferment,
and A and C are charged with making a false statement in
a letter concerning that deferment]; or
(ii) were so closely connected in respect to time,
place, and occasion that it would be difficult to separate
proof of one charge from proof of the others [e.g., when
A and B both are charged with negligent homicide in the
operation of separate vehicles involved in a single acci-
dent] ."6
Severance of joint defendants involves the same considerations
that were present in granting severance of offenses.97
The Standards relating to severance of a defendant named
in the confession of a co-defendant 98 follow the law established
96. Id. § 1.2.
97. Id. § 2.3(b).
98. Id. § 2.3(a). In Reed v. People, 482 P.2d 110 (Colo. 1971), this Stan-
dard was adopted as the law to be followed in determining whether a de-
fendant should be granted a severance when a co-defendant's out-of-court
statement is admitted into evidence. See also Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622,
636 (1971); People v. Marra, 27 Mich. App. 1, 183 N.W.2d 418, 422 (1971) (con-
curring opinion); Commonwealth v. Massey, 218 Pa. Super. 68, 272 A.2d 269,
270 (1970).
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in Bruton v. United States,99 which overruled the case of Delli
Paoli v. United States.'00 In the Bruton case, the Supreme Court
declared that it was the height of sophistry to think that the
jury could consider the confession against only the person who
had made the confession, when the other defendant was clearly
implicated thereby.
SPEEDY TRIAL
The Standards Relating to Speedy Trial are concerned with
how the interest of defendants and the public in prompt trials
should should be defined, protected, and achieved.'' Formula-
tion of the Standards was deemed especially necessary in light
of the recent application of the sixth amendment to the states,'02
and the considerable variety and uncertainty in state statutes
dealing with the right to speedy trial.
The Standards adopt the policies of the federal system and
those state jurisdictions which require that criminal trials should
take precedence over civil trials and provide that jailed defen-
dants should be tried before those on bail are tried.0 3 Although
no attempt is made to state a specific speedy trial limit in terms
of days or months, it is recommended that each jurisdiction
do so. 10 4 In order to compute such a time limit, the Standards
identify the point at which the time for trial begins running'0
5
and the periods during which the running of the time is tolled.' °6
Failure to grant a defendant a trial within the time limits pre-
99. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
100. 352 U.S. 232 (1957).
101. For discussion of the considerations involved, see Smith v. Hooey,
393 U.S. 374 (1969); Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968); Klopfer v. North
Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
102. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
103. ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS
RELATING TO SPEEDY TRIAL § 1.1 (app.draft 1968) [hereinafter cited as SPEEDY
TRIAL].
104. Id. § 2.1. For citation to this section, see Glasgow v. State, 469 P.2d
682, 688 (Alaska 1970); State v. Lee, 185 Neb. 184, 174 N.W.2d 344, 349 (1970).
105. SPEEDY TRIAL § 2.2. For citation to this section, see United States v.
Holt, 448 F.2d 1108, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Rutherford v. State, 486 P.2d 946,
951 (Alaska 1971); McMillen v. State, 182 N.W.2d 845, 847 (Minn. 1970).
106. SPEEDY TRIAL § 2.3. For citation to this section, see United States v.
Cartano, 420 F.2d 362, 364 (1st Cir. 1970); Garris v. United States, 418 F.2d
467, 469 (D.C. Cir. 1969); State v. Russo, 190 N.W.2d 853, 854 (Neb. 1971);
Commonwealth v. Learning, 275 A.2d 43, 46 (Pa. 1971).
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scribed results in the outright dismissal of charges with one
limitation.'0 7
In Indiana and other states, a shorter statute of limitations
exists for those in custody, and failure to try a defendant in
custody within the prescribed period results in the release of
the defendant on his own recognizance.'l 1
One matter of major practical importance in determining
the boundaries of the speedy trial guarantee arises from the
situation involving charges against a person serving a term
of imprisonment for another offense. The Standards deal with
such problems by providing that if the prosecutor knows that
a defendant is serving a prison term either within or outside
the jurisdiction, he must promptly undertake to obtain the
prisoner's presence for trial or file a detainer. 109 If a detainer is
filed, the custodial officials will so advise the prisoner and
inform him of his right to demand trial. If he makes such a
demand, it is to be transmitted to the prosecutor, who must
then seek to obtain the prisoner's presence for trial. 10 The
speedy trial limitations would commence to run when the
prisoner's presence has been obtained or when demand is made
by the defendant."' Periods of unreasonable delay in filing a
detainer or in seeking to obtain a prisoner's presence would be
included in computing the time limit for trial." 2
TRIAL BY JURY
The Standards Relating to Trial by Jury deal with various
aspects of jury trial in criminal cases, including such broad
issues as when the jury will be used," 3 how it should be
selected," 4 how the trial should be conducted to insure that the
107. SPEEDY TRIAL § 4.1. For citation to this section, see Short v. Cardwell,
444 F.2d 1368, 1371 (6th Cir. 1971); Kane v. State, 419 F.2d 1369, 1373 (4th
Cir. 1970); McMillen v. State, 182 N.W.2d 845, 847 (Minn. 1970); Common-
wealth v. Clark, 439 Pa. 192, 266 A.2d 741, 743 (1970).
108. SPEEDY TRIAL § 4.2.
109. Id. § 3.1(a) (i)-(i). For citation to this section, see Short v. Cardwell,
444 F.2d 1368, 1371 (6th Cir. 1971). See also Kane v. State, 419 F.2d 1369
(4th Cir. 1970).
110. SPEEDY TRIAL § 3.1(b).
111. Id. § 3.2.2.
112. Id.
113. ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS
RELATING TO TRIAL BY JURY §§ 1.1-1.3 (app.draft 1968) [hereinafter cited as
TRIAL BY JURY].
114. Id. §§ 2.1-2.7.
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jury plays a proper role, 115 and how the deliberations of the jury
should be aided and controlled." 6
After these Standards were approved, the United States
Supreme Court ruled, in Duncan v. Louisiana,"7 that the four-
teenth amendment controls on the states, with regard to the
right to a jury trial, are defined by the same boundaries that
the sixth amendment has drawn for the federal system. This
was made even more specific in the later case of Baldwin v.
New York."" However, in Justice Fortas' concurrence in Duncan,
buttressed by a footnote of the Court, there is optimism that the
Supreme Court may reconsider certain suggested proposals of
the Standards, such as: trial without jury for lesser offenses,
provided there is a right to appeal without unreasonable restric-
tion to a court in which a trial de novo by a jury may be had; 1 9
juries of less than twelve;120 and less than unanimous verdicts.'1 2
Of course, state courts are free to adopt these procedures, unless
and until the Supreme Court mandates otherwise.
The sections pertaining to waiver of jury trial provide
that waiver is personal to the defendant and can only be accom-
plished after the defendant is advised by the court of his rights. 22
The defendant may waive his right to trial by jury either in
writing or in open court for the record,' 23 but the defendant's
waiver must be voluntarily and knowingly entered. 24 Consent
of the prosecution or the court is not made a condition to effec-
tive waiver of jury trial by the defendant.
115. Id. §§ 4.1-4.7. Among other matters, these sections Include a dis-
cussion of physical restraint of defendants and witnesses (§ 4.1, cited in
State v. Cassel, 48 Wis.2d 619, 180 N.W.2d 607, 611 (1970)); substitution ofjudges by reason of death, sickness or other disability (0 4.3, cited in United
States v. Bailey, 426 F.2d 1236, 1243 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1970)); and motion forjudgment of acquittal (§ 4.5, cited in McAutha v. California, 402 U.S. 183
(1971)).
116. TRIAL BY JURY §§ 5.1-5.7.
117. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
118. 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
119. TRIAL BY JURY § 1.1(b).
120. Id. § 1.1(c).
121. Id. § 1.1(d).
122. Ird. §§ 1.2(b), 1.3(c). For cases citing § 1.2(b) with approval, see
Harvin v. United States, 445 F.2d 675, 684 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United States v.
Straite, 425 F.2d 594, 595-96 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
123. TRIAL BY JURY §§ 1.2(b), 1.3(c).
124. Id. § 1.2(a)-(c). See State v. Jelks, 461 P.2d 473 (Ariz. 1969), in
which there was a vigorous dissent that relied heavily upon § 1.2 and the
commentary thereto in arguing that constitutional rights of this nature
could only be effectively waived if the defendant were addressed personally
to insure that the waiver was voluntarily and Intelligently made.
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On selection of prospective jurors, the Standards focus upon
the appropriate criteria for determining juror qualifications and
exemptions. 12 They also provide that upon request the parties
should be furnished with a list of prospective jurors.126 The
Standards follow the federal practice of having the court con-
duct the voir dire to ascertain whether grounds exist for a
challenge for cause and to aid counsel in the intelligent exercise
of peremptory challenges. 127
The Standards contain several controversial features. One
such feature is the right of jurors to take notes in the course
of the trial; 28 another is the right of the trial judge to comment
upon the evidence, subject to certain limitations. 129 In dealing
with the shot-gun instruction, or dynamite charge, permitted
by Allen v. United States,180 the Standards condemn the con-
tinued use of the instruction. If it is to be used at all, it should
be used at the time the initial instructions are given rather
than after the jury has commenced its deliberation.13
The Standards recommend that the court instruct the jury
after the arguments of counsel. 8 2 In addition, the Standards
direct that the court advise counsel of the instructions that are
to be given before argument. 3 They also set forth procedures
to be followed when the jury wants to review certain evidence 184
and when additional instructions are needed. 35
125. TRIAL BY JURY § 2.1.
126. Id. § 2.2.
127. Id. § 2.4. See United States v. Anderson, 433 F.2d 856, 858 (8th Cir.
1970).
128. TRIAL BY JURY § 4.2.
129. Id. § 4.7. This section was recently cited, together with the com-
mentary, in United States v. Kwitek, 433 F.2d 18, 20 (7th Cir. 1970). In
United States v. Garaway, 425 F.2d 185 (9th Cir. 1970), the court cited §
4.7(b)(ii) in support of its holding that a judge cannot express an opinion
as to the defendant's guilt. And in United States v. Smith, 399 F.2d 896 (6th
Cir. 1968), the court followed the tentative draft of TRIAL BY JURY, holding
that a judge may neither express an opinion on guilt nor suggest a verdict
to the jury.
130. 164 U.S. 492 (1896).
131. TRIAL BY JURY § 5.4. Numerous cases have adopted the approach
recommended by this section. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez, 446 F.2d
118, 120 (2d Cir. 1971); United States v. Johnson, 432 F.2d 626, 631-33 (D.C.
Cir. 1970); United States v. Sawyers, 423 F.2d 1335, 1342, 1346 (4th Cir. 1970);
Basurto v. State, 472 P.2d 339, 341 (Nev. 1970); State v. Marsh, 490 P.2d 491,
495 (Ore. 1971); Kelly v. State, 51 Wis.2d 641, 187 N.W.2d 810, 812-13 (1971).
132. TRIAL BY JURY § 4.6(d).
133. Id. § 4.6(c).
134. Id. § 5.2. This section was followed in United States v. Schor, 418
F.2d 26, 31 (2d Cir. 1969).
135. TRIAL BY JURY § 5.3, cted in. State v. Saul, 258 Md. 100, 265 A.2d 178,
181 (1970).
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The Standards also spell out with some particularity the
manner in which a jury verdict can be impeached, and permit
a juror to testify as to improper matters or conduct in the jury-
room which denied the defendant his constitutional right to
confrontation of witnesses. 186
SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES
The Standards Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and Pro-
cedures are premised on the conclusion that judges, rather than
lay juries, should exercise sentencing authority.'8 7 This view
is based on the difficulties presented by sentencing decisions
and the need to develop an expertise beyond that which can be
expected of the average jury. Because many of the problems in
the area of sentencing are legislative in nature, the Standards
are not limited to what judges can do; instead, they are aimed,
as well, at the need for legislative changes in the substantive
criminal law which would provide a rational scheme for sentenc-
ing and which would allow judges a wider range of alternatives.
In an effort to improve sentencing procedures, the Standards
propose that all crimes be classified, for the purpose of sen-
tencing, into categories which reflect substantial differences in
gravity. 138 The establishment of a maximum term is recom-
mended in all cases. 139 The Standards also recommend that man-
datory and minimum sentences be abolished, but include author-
ity for the judicial imposition of minimum sentences under stated
circumstances. 1'0
The Standards emphasize that many sentences authorized
by statute are significantly longer than necessary in the vast
136. TRIAL BY JURY § 5.7. This section was cited in Miller v. United
States, 403 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1968), as authority for the proposition that post-
conviction interrogation of jurors by private parties should be forbidden.
Instead, the judge should make inquiries and take objective evidence of
substantive, but not procedural, grounds for impeachment of the verdict.
137. ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS
RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES § 1.1 (app.draft 1968)
[hereinafter cited as SENTENCING]. Extensive support for this conclusion is
collected in Note, Jury Sentencing in Virginia, 53 VA. L. REV. 968, 970 n.3
(1967). See also Zimmer v. State, 206 Kan. 304, 477 P.2d 971, 978 (1970),
citing § 1.1(c).
138. SENTENCING § 2.1(a).
139. Id. § 3.1.
140. Id. §§ 3.2, 2.1(c). See United States v. Chappell, 292 F. Supp. 494
(C.D. Cal. 1968), in which § 2.1(c)) was cited with approval.
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majority of cases.' 4 ' The Standards suggest that it would be
desirable for the penal code to differentiate between most offend-
ers and the exceptionally dangerous offender, by providing
lower and more realistic sentences for the former and autho-
rizing a special term for the latter.1 42 The commentary to those
Standards dealing with special term sentences, habitual offender
sentences 43 and consecutive sentences, 4 4 makes it clear that
the draftsmen of the Standards were acting on the philosophy
that lengthy prison sentences are, as a rule, overused in the
sense that many offenders now serving such terms do not pose
the requisite danger to society that provides a justification for
prolonged incarceration. The Standards call for more discriminate
use of long sentences. By the same token, consecutive sentences
are discouraged, and their imposition authorized only after a
finding that confinement for such a term is necessary in order
to protect the public from further criminal conduct by the
defendant. 14' To avoid disparity in sentencing, the Standards
further recommend that the defendant be granted credit for
time spent in custody prior to the imposition of sentence.14
As part of a scheme allowing greater flexibility in sentencing,
the Standards recommend probation,' 47 partial confinement, 48
total confinement,' 49 use of special facilities,"50 and fines.1" Fines
are recommended as appropriate for felonies only in the case
where the defendant has gained money or property through
the commission of the offense. 152 Alternative sentences, specify-
ing the amount of jail time which is to be served in the event
141. SENTENCING § 2.1(d); accord, United States v. McCoy, 429 F.2d 739,
743-44 (D.C. Cir. 1970); McCleary v. State, 49 Wis.2d 263, 182 N.W.2d 512,
518 (1971).
142. SENTENCING §§ 2.5(b), 3.1(c).
143 Id. § 3.3.
144. Id. § 3.4(b).
145. Id. § 3.4(b)(iv).
146. Id. §§ 3.6, 5.8. For cases referencing these Standards, see People v.
Jones, 489 P.2d 596 (Colo. 1971); Ibsen v. Warden, Nevada State Penitentiary,
86 Nev. 540, 471 P.2d 229, 233 (1970); Fanley v. State, 50 Wis.2d 113, 116, 183
N.W.2d 33, 35 (1971).
147. SENTENCING § 2.3.
148. Id. § 2.4.
149 Id. § 2.5.
150. Id. § 2.6.
151. Id. § 2.7.
152. Id. § 2.7(a).
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of nonpayment, should be prohibited. 158 Total confinement is
recommended only as a last resort.16
Sentencing proceedings should take place as soon as prac-
tical after the determination of guilt and the examination
of presentence reports.15 5 Such reports should be prepared in
every case,', 6 and all derogatory information therein not other-
wise disclosed in open court should be brought to the attention
of the defendant and his attorney. 57 The sentencing proceeding
should also include full opportunity for the submission by
the parties of the facts relevant to the sentence and arguments
by defense counsel.'5 In addition, the defendant should be
afforded the right of allocution 59
Reduction or modification of a sentence based upon new
factors bearing on the sentence is approved, so long as the
proceedings are conducted in open court within a reasonable
time.160 Under no circumstances, however, should the sentencing
court be authorized to increase a term of imprisonment once
it has been imposed.16
PROBATION
The Standards Relating to Probation are designed to comple-
153. Id. § 2.7(e). For a recent case reaching a result consistent with
§ 2.7(e), see Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971).
154. See SENTENCING § 2.2. See also Neely v. State, 47 Wis.2d 330, 177
N.W.2d 79, 82 (1970), in which § 2.2 is discussed.
155. SENTENCING § 5.4(a). In addition, § 5.2(a) of the Standards provides
that to the extent possible, all outstanding convictions should be consolidated
for sentencing at one time. See People v. Terven, 264 N.E.2d 538, 540 (Ill.
1970). See also Austin v. State, 49 Wis.2d 727, 183 N.W.2d 56, 58 (1971).
156. SENTENCING § 4.1. Similar reports are also recommended In revoca-
tion proceedings. See § 5.5(c), cited in Hahn v. Burke, 430 F.2d 100, 104
(7th Cir. 1970). See also United States v. Hazelrigg, 430 F.2d 580, 582-83 (8th
Cir. 1970); People v. Moton, 25 Mich.App. 383, 181 N.W.2d 571, 572 (1970);
State v. Schilz, 50 Wis.2d 395, 184 N.W.2d 134, 137-38 (1971); McCleary v.
State, 49 Wis.2d 263, 182 N.W.2d 512, 518 (1971).
157. Id. § 4.4. This section was cited with approval and followed In
United States v. Dockery, 447 F.2d 1178, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See also United
States v. Rubin, 433 F.2d 442, 446 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Bakewell,
430 F.2d 721, 722 (5th Cir. 1970); Verdugo v. United States, 402 F.2d 599
(9th Cir. 1968); Hanson v. State, 48 Wis.2d 203, 179 N.W.2d 909, 913 (1970).
158. SENTENCING §§ 5.4(a)(i)-(ii) and 5.3. § 5.3, which sets forth counsel's
duties in sentencing procedures, has been cited in United States v. Malcolm,
432 F.2d 809, 818 (2d Cir. 1970) and State v. Bergeron, 185 N.W.2d 894, 896
(Minn. 1971).
159. SENTENCING § 5.4(a)(iii).
160. Id. § 6.1(a). For a case citing § 6.1(a) and holding that a request
for reduction or modification of sentence was not within a reasonable time,
see State v. Dunn, 282 A.2d 675, 676 (N.H. 1971).
161. SENTENCING § 6.1(b).
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ment the Standards Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and
Procedures. Together, they seek to promote greater flexibility in
sentencing as a means of rehabilitating criminal offenders and
decreasing the costs of correction to society.
The Standards Relating to Probation are premised on the
theory that probation can lead to significant improvements in
the preventive effects of the criminal law and should be an
available disposition in all cases except the most serious
offenses.16 2 In particular, the Standards provide that probation
should be the sentence in a criminal case, unless confinement
is necessary to protect the public from further criminal activity
by the defendant, 65 the offender is in need of correctional treat-
ment which can be most effectively provided if he is confined,'6 4
or it would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the offense if a
sentence of probation were granted.0 5
The question of what information should be available to
the court when it passes sentence is also considered in the
Standards. The Standards recommend that a presentence report
be made available in all criminal cases to assist the judge in
making an intelligent decision. 166 Because of the importance of
presentence reports, the Standards set forth detailed guidelines
concerning their content, scope, and length.6 7
In addition, the Standards consider what the conditions of
probation shall be l 8 and when probation should be terminated.0 9
Basically, the Standards recommend that probation be tailored
to the needs of each individual offender and subject to such
modifications or conditions during the course of the probation
as are indicated by the probationer's progress or lack of progress.
With regard to the issue of probation revocation, the Stan-
162. ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS
RELATING TO PROBATION § 1.1(a) (app.draft 1970) [hereinafter cited as PROBA-
TION]. The general purpose of these Standards has been approved in State
v. Johnson, 270 A.2d 537, 538 (Del. Super. 1970).
163. PROBATION § 1.3(a)(i). See Hamilton v. State, 481 P.2d 471, 473 (Okla.
1971), for citation to § 1.3(a).
164. PROBATION § 1.3(a)(ii).
165 Id. § 1.3(a)(Iii). Whether the defendant pleads guilty, not guilty, or
intends to appeal is not relevant to the Issue of whether probation is a
proper sentence. § 1.3(b), cited in State v. Bergeron, 185 N.W.2d 894, 896
(Minn. 1971).
166. PROBATION § 2.1(a).
167. Id. § 2.3.
168. Id. § 3.2.
169. Id. §§ 4.1-4.2.
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dards provide specific criteria to assist in the determination of
when probation should be revoked in favor of a prison sentence.
In substance, the Standards favor revocation only when the
defendant's behavior constitutes grounds for imposing a sentence
to imprisonment in the first instance.170 The Standards also
propose procedures to be followed in hearings that are held to
determine whether probation should be revoked. 17'
The Standards conclude with recommendations addressed
to the legislatures for the improvement of probation services. 172
CRIMINAL APPEALS
The Standards Relating to Criminal Appeals deal with the
structure of the appellate system, the nature of access by parties
to the appellate level, the problems of transition of cases from
the trial courts to the appellate courts., and the internal process-
ing of appeals by appellate tribunals.17 3
While recognizing the need to adopt procedures consonant
with the purposes of appellate criminal review, 74 the Standards
counsel against specialized courts of criminal appeal. 75 The ex-
planation offered by the commentary to the Standards is that,
"[a] court whose work is essentially confined to criminal
cases is unlikely to attract the continuing attention, interest
and concern of the entire bar, a situation that is not desir-
able for the well-being of the court nor its stature in the
public mind."'' 7
The commentary also suggests that specialized criminal courts
of appeal could result in a hardening of attitude on the part
of the judiciary.
170. Id. § 5.1(a).
171. Id. § 5.4. For citation to the Standards regarding the rights of a
defendant in a revocation proceeding, see Bearden v. State, 443 F.2d 1090,
1098 (4th Cir. 1971); State ex rel. Johnson v. Cody, 50 Wis.2d 540, 185 N.W.2d
306, 316 (1971). See also Ex parte Jones, 460 S.W.2d 428, 431 (Tex. 1970).
172. PROBATION §§ 6.1-6.7.
173. For an article reporting the results of one empirical study of the
various factors causing delay in criminal appeals, see Christian, Delay in
Criminal Appeals: A Functional Analysis of One Court's Work, 23 STAN. L.
REv. 676 (1971).
174. ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS
RELATING TO CRIMINAL APPEALS § 1.2(a) (app.draft 1970) [hereinafter cited as
CRIMINAL APPEALS].
175. Id. § 1.2(b).
176. Id. § 1.2(e), commentary.
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On the question of access to appellate courts, the Standards
adopt the view that an appeal of right should exist in every
criminal conviction. 17 However, an appeal is not considered to
be a necessary and integral part of every conviction; conse-
quently, the appellate process must be instigated at the defen-
dant's election.178
The Standards also provide for a broader right of appeal
by the prosecution in criminal cases than is found in most states.
The prosecution is given the right to an interlocutory appeal
when the issue of double jeopardy, speedy trial, unconstitu-
tionality of a statute, or suppression of evidence results in dis-
missal or the effective termination of the case.179 Interlocutory
appeals by the defendant are generally not recommended. 180
Transition of cases from the trial court to an appellate
court raises numerous issues. Those considered in the Standards
include time limits within which to process an appeal,'"' trial
counsel's duties with regard to appeal,'8 2 inducement and deter-
rents to taking appeals,'13 and frivolous appeals.8 4 Although sub-
stantial attention is given to the elimination of frivolous appeals,
the Standards take the position that the only solution is to find
administrative ways to expedite the flow of cases through the
appellate forum to the final decision on the merits.l 5 If defense
counsel cannot dissuade a client from bringing a frivolous appeal,
the Standards provide that it is not improper for counsel to
submit the case on brief without oral argument. 8 6
Because of constitutional infirmities which are believed to
be inherent in denying a transcript to an indigent, the Standards
177. CRIMINAL APPEALS § 1.1(a).
178. Id. § 1.1(b).
179. Id. § 1.4(a). See State v. Blondin, 270 A.2d 165, 166 (Vt. 1970), for
citation to § 1.4(a).
180. CRIMINAL APPEALS § 1.3(b)(i). See State v. Blondin, 270 A.2d 165, 166
(Vt. 1970), for citation to § 1.3(b).
181. CRIMINAL APPEALS § 2.1.
182. Id. § 2.2.
183. Id. § 2.3.
184. Id. § 2.4.
185. Id. § 2.4(a) (ii).
186. Id. § 3.2(b)(ii). The recommendations of the Standards regarding
the duties of defense counsel on appeal are founded largely upon Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). In the case of McClendon v. People, 481 P.2d
715 (Colo. 1971), defense counsel determined that the appeal of his client
lacked merit. Unable to dissuade his client from appealing, he submitted
the case on briefs which presented each of the points urged by the defendant
as a basis for appeal. The court approved of defense counsel's decision and
cited the Standards in support of his action.
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recommend that transcripts be made available as requested by
counsel for appellants.187
APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES
The Standards Relating to Appellate Review of Sentences
reflect a minority view, inasmuch as review of the merits of
a sentence has actually been undertaken by appellate courts
in less than one-half of the states. 88 The reason sentence review
has been unavailable in so many states and federal jurisdictions
is that courts have been hesitant to exercise such power in the
absence of clear statutory authority.8 9 Because of the judiciary's
reluctance to act, the Standards were drafted primarily to assist
legislatures in facing the task of developing a system of appellate
review of sentences. 190
One reason for appellate review of sentences is that different
judges impose widely disparate sentences for the same offense.
In most instances, grossly excessive sentences can only be cor-
rected by the executive. Sentence review should force sentencing
decisions into the open, and thereby expose for correction numer-
ous mistakes that need not be made again. Moreover, defendants
who are sentenced to terms of confinement that conform to those
imposed on other inmates are much more likely to approach
rehabilitation with a positive attitude than defendants who are
deprived of an opportunity to air their grievances concerning
the sentences imposed.191
187. CRIMINAL APPEALS § 3.3(b). See also Cash v. United States, 261 F.2d
731, 740, 741 (D.C. Cir.) (Edgerton, C.J. dissenting), vacated, 357 U.S. 219,
(1958): "[Tlhe burden of prosecuting, defending and deciding appeals,
though it is greater, is not inordinately greater than the burden of prose-
cuting and deciding disputes . .. over the question of whether an appeal
should be made possible."
188. See Mueller, Penology on Appeal: Appellate Review of Legal but
Excessive Sentences, 15 VAND. L. REV. 671, 688-97 (1962).
189. See, e.g., United States v. Martell, 335 F.2d 764, 767-68 (4th Cir.
1964); United States v. Rosenburg, 195 F.2d 583, 604-07 (2d Cir. 1952); State
v. Wright, 261 N.C. 356, 134 S.E.2d 624 (1964); Mason v. State, 375 S.W.2d
916 (Tex. Crim. App. 1964).
190. In Minnesota, the opportunity for an appellate court to review a
sentence has been presented on at least two recent occasions, and In both
instances the court declined, but recommended that the legislature consider
the Standards with a view to passing legislation to provide for sentence
review. McLaughlin v. State, 190 N.W.2d 867, 872 (Minn. 1971); State v.
Gamelgard, 287 Minn. 74, 80, 177 N.W.2d 404, 408 (1970).
191. ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS
RELATING TO APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES § 1.2 (app.draft 1968) [herein-
after cited as APPELLATE REVIEW). See also id. Introduction, at 2. Express
recognition of these Standards has already occurred In a number of states.
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The Standards accord to the sentencing function the im-
portance which it deserves and place the same safeguards on
sentencing that are recognized for every other step in the
criminal proceeding. Ultimately, the Standards should reduce
the number of appeals, because defendants will recognize that
their sentence may, in fact, be increased.192
Basically, the Standards propose that:
(1) sentence review should be available in every case in
which review of a trial leading to conviction would be
available;193
(2) existing appellate courts should be empowered to review
the sentence along with the other issues in the case; 94
(3) a transcript of all that occurs in open court with regard
to the sentence, together with presentence reports,
should be made a part of the record before the reviewing
court; 19 5 and
(4) the reviewing court should be empowered to make any
disposition that was open to the sentencing court.9 6
Although it is expected that the Standards will be of more
assistance to legislatures than to courts, one court recently found
authority for review in the "persuasive legal literature," which
included the Standards Relating to Appellate Review of Sen-
tences and the state constitution.197
POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES
The Standards Relating to Post-Conviction Remedies provide
a renovated system of post-conviction relief which permits
review of questions which were not finally adjudicated when
the accused was convicted and sentenced. 198
See, e.g., State v. Chaney, 477 P.2d 441, 443 (Alaska 1970); Nicholas v. State,
477 P.2d 447, 448, 450 (Alaska 1970); McCleary v. State, 49 Wis.2d 263, 182
N.W.2d 512, 521 (1971).
192. APPELLATE REviEw § 3.3.
193. Id. § 1.1(a).
194. Id. § 2.1.
195. Id. § 2.3(a). See generally McCleary v. State, 49 Wis.2d 263, 281-82,
292, 182 N.W.2d 512, 522, 527 (1971).
196. APPELLATE REviEW § 3.3. See also State v. Chaney, 477 P.2d 441, 443
(Alaska 1970), for discussion of the scope of appellate review.
197. State v. Laws, 51 N.J. 494, 242 A.2d 333 (1968).
198. For a comprehensive survey of the post-conviction remedies avail-
able throughout the United States, see Strazzella, Review of Criminal Con-
victions, 50 MicH. ST. B.J. 748, 751 (1971).
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The Standards envision a unified, comprehensive, post-
conviction remedy. 199 In an effort to accomplish that purpose,
the Standards encompass all grounds for attacking the validity
of a conviction or sentence in a criminal case.20 0 Unlike habeas
corpus, the post-conviction remedy is made available even though
the applicant is not presently serving the sentence he seeks to
challenge.20 1 Because many post-conviction motions are filed pro
se, the Standards also include recommendations regarding the
needs of prisoners in preparing applications for relief. 20 2
The Standards seek to minimize procedural complexities
in favor of facilitating prompt consideration of applications on
the merits of the contentions advanced.203 Where there is no
factual issue, applications for post-conviction relief can appro-
priately be decided on the merits without a plenary hearing.20 4
In those cases involving the determination of factual issues,
discovery techniques, specially adapted for post-conviction pro-
ceedings, should be utilized for assistance in advancing the case
toward disposition.2 0 5 Once an issue of fact or law has been
determined, that adjudication ought to be final and binding.
In order to effectuate the finality of judicial decisions, the Stan-
dards require that adequate records of prior proceedings be
prepared and preserved.20 6 Appellate review is proposed as a
matter of right at the instance of either party.20 7 Where a sen-
199. ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICe, STANDARDS
RELATING TO POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES § 1.1 (app.draft 1968) [hereinafter
cited as REMEDIES]. See also People ex rel. Anderson v. Warden, 325 N.Y.S.2d
829 (1971), in which the court noted with approval that the New York
statutory post-conviction remedies were consistent with the STANDARDS RE-
LATING TO POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES Hi 1.1 (Unitary post-conviction remedy),
1.2 (Characterization of the proceeding), 1.4 (Jurisdiction and venue), and
2.3 (Custody requirement).
200. REMEDIES § 2.1. In McMillen v. State, 289 Minn. 40, 182 N.W.2d 845,
847 (1970), the court was faced with a change In the law as a ground for
post-conviction relief, and it considered § 2.1(a)(vi) to be relevant to its
decision.
201. REMEDIES § 2.3. This Standard is well established, having been cited
with approval in Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968).
202. REMEDIES §§ 3.1-3.5 In United States v. Simpson, 436 F.2d 162, 168-69
(D.C. Cir. 1970), for example, the court considered the possibility of utilizing
law students to assist prisoners in making application for relief and cited
§ 3.1(c) (i).
203. REMEDIES § 6.1(c). See generally State v. Provencher, 270 A.2d 147,
150 (Vt. 1970), citing §§ 6.1, 6.2 and commentary thereto.
204. REMEDIES § 4.5(a). See Dabbs v. People, 486 P.2d 1053, 1054 (Colo.
1971), in which § 4.5(a) was quoted verbatim and adopted as controlling.
205. REMEDIES § 4.5(b).
206. Id. §§ 6.1(a)(i), 4.6(c). See In re Mossey, 274 A.2d 473, 476 (Vt. 1971),
citing § 4.6(d) on burden of proof.
207. REMEDIES § 5.1(b).
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tence is set aside as the result of a successful application for
post-conviction relief and the defendant is to be resentenced, the
sentencing court should not be empowered to increase the penalty
that was originally imposed.2 8
In short, the Post-Conviction Standards simplify the pro-
cedure and fill in the gaps that existed in the federal practice.2 9
Also, the Standards provide a means for eliminating frivolous
and false allegations and insure finality in every case.
210
THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION
AND
THE DEFENSE FUNCTION
The Standards Relating to The Prosecution Function and The
Defense Function are intended to serve as a guide to lawyers and
judges, a code of professional discipline, and a handbook for law
students and the general public. Formulation of the Standards
was undertaken because of the dearth of authority on the subject
of defense responsibility and the increasing complexity of crim-
inal practice. The Standards are purposely placed under one
cover so that the reader may view together all aspects of the
functions of the opposing advocates in the administration of
criminal justice and recognize the extent to which they are
governed by the same basic principles. Because of the breadth of
the subject involved, many of the issues considered in these
Standards have also been considered in depth in other volumes
of the American Bar Association Standards of Criminal Justice.21n
The Standards Relating to the Prosecution Function point
out that the prosecutor is both an administrator exercising dis-
cretion and an advocate. 212 His basic duty is to seek justice, not
208. Id. § 6.3(a). Contra, North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
See also Weeks v. State, 267 A.2d 641, 647 (Me. 1970).
209. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970). See also UNIFORM POST-CONVICTION PROCEDURE
ACT, 9B U.L.A. 541 (1955).
210. The American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice: Pre-
scription for an Ailing System, 47 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 429 (1972). In federal
practice the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, tit. X, 84 Stat. 922 (codi-
fied in scattered sections of U.S.C.) permits an increase in sentence on
appeal by the prosecution.
211. See, e.g., the discussion of the prosecutor's role in plea discussions
which Is included In PLEAS oF GUILTY § 3.1.
212. ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS
RELATING TO THE PROPOSITION FUNCTION § 1.1(b) (app.draft 1912) [hereinafter
cited as PROSECUTION FUNCTION].
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merely to convict.21 s The Standards discuss in detail the prosecu-
tor's role in the areas of investigation and charging,214 plea
discussions,215 trial,21 6 and sentencing.21 7
The Standards Relating to The Defense Function outline
similar duties of a lawyer in representing those accused of crime
from pre-arraignment to post-conviction. 21 8 The Standards are
particularly helpful in answering questions involving control
and direction of litigation.21 9 The Standards explain that some
of the decisions relating to the conduct of the case are ulti-
mately for the accused, while others are ultimately for defense
counsel. After full consultation with counsel, the accused must
decide what plea to enter, whether to waive a jury trial, and
whether to take the stand and testify in his own behalf. Other
decisions, such as the decision on what witnesses to call, whether
and how to conduct cross-examination, what jurors to accept
or strike, what trial motions to make, and all other strategic
and tactical decisions are the exclusive province of the lawyer
after consultation with his client.221
The Standards also consider the particularly knotty problem
which arises when the defendant has admitted to his lawyer
facts which establish guilt, but the defendant, nevertheless,
insists upon taking the stand to testify. The Standards take the
213. Id. § 1.1(c).
214. Id. H9 3.1-3.9.
215. Id. § 4.1-4.3.
216. Id. § 5.1-5.10. § 5.6(c) was cited by the court in United States v.
Lewis, 435 F.2d 417, 420 (D.C. Cir. 1970), when discussing the Impropriety
of the prosecutor In displaying prejudicial, tangible evidence prior to good
faith tender of such evidence. § 5.8(b), relating to the prosecutor's argument
to the jury, was cited In State v. Burgess, 185 N.W.2d 537, 539 (Minn. 1971).
217. PROSECUTION FUNCTION §§ 6.1, 6.2.
218. ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS
RELATING TO THE DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4.1-4.5 (app.draft 1968) (Investigation
and Preparation); 5.1-5.3 (Control and Direction of Litigation); 6.1-6.2
(Disposition Without Trial); 7.1-7.10 (Trial); 8.1-8.5 (After Conviction)
[hereinafter cited as DEFENSE FUNCTION]. A sampling of the cases citing
these sections follows: State v. Oliver, 23 Ohio App. 2d 210, 262 N.E. 2d 424,
426 (1970), citing § 3.5(b) on conflicts of interest; State v. Reichenberger,
182 N.W.2d 692, 696 (Minn. 1970), citing § 4.3 on relations with prospective
witnesses; State v. Schlz, 50 Wis.2d 395, 184 N.W.2d 134, 140 (1971), citing
§ 6.1(b) on the duty to explore disposition without trial; McClendon v.
People, 481 P.2d 417 (Colo. 1971), citing § 8.3 on responsibilities of counsel
on appeal.
219. DEFENSE FUNCTION § 5.2.
220. Id. § 5.2(a). This provision has been cited with approval in McClen-
don v. People, 481 P.2d 417 (Colo. 1971) and Martinez v. People, 480 P.2d
483, 484 (Colo. 1971).
221. DEFENSE FUNCTION § 5.2(b), cited in United States ex re7. Sabella v.
Follette, 432 F.2d 572, 576 (2d Cir. 1970).
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position that if this situation arose before trial, the lawyer must
withdraw from the case, if that is feasible.222 If withdrawal is
not feasible, or is not permitted by the court, or if the situa-
tion arose during the trial, it is unprofessional conduct for the
lawyer to lend his aid to the perjury or use the perjured testi-
mony. The lawyer must confine his examination of the defendant
to identifying the witness as the accused and permit him to
make his statement to the trier or triers of fact. The lawyer may
not examine him in the conventional manner and may not later
argue the defendant's known false version of the facts to the
jury as worthy of belief. Nor may he recite or rely upon the
false testimony in his closing argument.223
FUNCTION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE
The completed portion of the Standards Relating to Function
of the Trial Judge considers the judge's role in dealing with trial
disruptions. These Standards, together with the Standards Relat-
ing to The Prosecution Function and The Defense Function, Fair
Trial and Free Press, and Providing Defense Services provide
guidelines for trial conduct which, if properly enforced, should
minimize abuse of the trial process.
Every member of the American public had reason to pause
and reflect and to reconsider the position occupied by lawyers
and judges in our society after the "Chicago Seven" case became
a spectacle. 224 The history of trial disruption dictates that stan-
dards are necessary and should be formulated immediately if
the dignity of the court is to be preserved.225 Discipline of the
disruptive lawyer must be administered without delay. As a
result, the special committee, under the chairmanship of Judge
Frank Murray, released an advance report relating to the judge's
role in dealing with trial disruptions.
Shortly after the "Chicago Seven" trial, the Supreme Court
of the United States dealt with the problem in the case of
222. Id. § 7.7(b).223. Id. § 7.7(c).
224. See United States v. Dillinger, 69 C.R. 180 (N.D. Ill. 1970); United
States v. Dillinger, - F.2d - (7th Cir. 1971); Seale v. Hoffman, 306 F. Supp.
333 (N.D. Ill. 1969). Note, The Imposition of Disciplinary Measures for the
Misconduct of Attorneys, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 1039 (1952).
225. ABA SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT
PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT (1970).
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Illinois v. Allen.2m In the Allen case, the defendant questioned
whether the judge could cause a trial to be completed after the
defendant had been removed from the courtroom for threatening
the court on numerous occasions and for employing tactics to
disrupt and delay the trial.22 Allen looked to the sixth amend-
ment and his right to confront witnesses as a basis for claiming
that he had been denied a fair trial when he was ordered
removed from the courtroom after repeated warnings and after
he had thrown his counsel's books and papers on the floor. On
post-conviction proceedings by Allen, the United States Supreme
Court unanimously upheld the trial judge's authority to exclude
a disruptive defendant from the courtroom while his trial con-
tinued.
The Court's holding has gone a long way toward stemming
tactics deliberately aimed at obstructing the judicial process
and quieting fears that the system could not respond fairly and
effectively to threats against its survival. The Standards attempt
to further delineate the responsibility and the power of the trial
judge to deal with disruptions. In general, the Standards relate
to the need to consider carefully the choice of a sanction for
misconduct and to prescribe special rules of order as a precau-
tion against disruptions. More specifically, the Standards con-
sider judicial use of the contempt power 228 and the establishment
of guidelines for the deportment of the judge himself.229 In addi-
tion, the Standards deal with the control of spectators,28° the
226. 397 U.S. 337 (1970). See Flauman & Thompson, The Case of the
Disruptive Defendant: Illinois v. Allen, 61 J. Cium. L.C. & P.S. 327 (1970);
Hazard, Securing Courtroom Decorum, 80 YALE L.J. 443 (1970); Tigar,
Waiver of Constitutional Rights: Disquiet in the Citadel, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1970); Note, The Power of the Judge to Command Order in the Courtroom:
The Options of Illinois v. Allen, 65 Nw. U.L. REV. 671 (1970); Note, Illinois v.
Allen: The Unruly Defendant's Right to a Fair Trial, 46 N.Y.U. L. REV.
120 (1971).
227. See Epting, Dealing with Unruly Person in the Courtroom, 6 CRIM.
L. BULL. 473 (1970); Murray, The Power to Expel a Criminal Defendant
from His Own Trial: A Comparative View, 36 U. COLO. L. REV. 171 (1964).
228. ABA PROJECT ON-MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS
RELATING TO FUNCTION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE H§ F.1-F.5 (app.draft 1972) [here-
inafter cited as TRIAL JUDGE]. In addition, see Mayberry v. Pennsylvania,
400 U.S. 455 (1971), in which the Supreme Court held that it was a denial
of due process for the contempt citation not to be reviewed by a different
judge prior to imposition of punishment. See also 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1970); FED.
R. CRIM. P. 42; R. GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT POWER (1963); Frankfurter &
Landis, Power of Congress Over Our Procedure in Criminal Contempts in
Inferior Federal Courts, 37 HARV. L. REV. 1010 (1923).
229. TRIAL JUDGE § B.1.
230. Id. § E.1.
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occasional need to make special arrangements for representatives
of the news media,281 and the disruptive conduct of defendants282
and attorneys.2 3
In drafting the Standards Relating to Function of the Trial
Judge, the special committee had the benefit of the work done by
the American College of Trial Lawyers.23 4 Moreover, the com-
mittee has attempted to weave into the final draft coordinating
provisions which will cause the Standards to dovetail with all
other Standards, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and
the Code of Judicial Ethics. When finally completed, the Stan-
dards, as a whole, will provide an integrated set of rules and
regulations for the handling of every phase of a criminal case.
URBAN POLICE FUNCTION
Although the Standards Relating to Urban Police Function
have not yet been approved, a tentative draft of the Standards
has been completed. The proposed Standards are addressed to
the problems of law enforcement agencies in metropolitan
areas. They provide general policy recommendations, rather than
specific rules of conduct to be followed by individual police
officers. In particular, they provide guidelines and direction for
the operation of metropolitan police departments. No attempt
has been made at this time to offer Standards for the rural
police or for the relatively small police department.
The Standards go to the scope of the police function and
attempt to identify the principal objectives and responsibilities
of police departments. The Standards also consider the methods
and authority available to the police for fulfilling the tasks given
them. In addition, they recognize the need for control over
police authority and recommend various methods of review.
The need to provide adequate police resources is given lengthy
consideration. Moreover, the desirability of seeking and develop-
ing public understanding and support of police is suggested in
the Standards.
The Standards Relating to Urban Police Function will un-
231. Id. § E.2.
232. Id. § C.1.
233. Id. § D.1.
234. American College of Trial Lawyers Code of Trial Conduct (1972);
American College of Trial Lawyers Report and Recommendations on Dis-
ruption of the Judicial Process (1970).
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doubtedly be refined before the Standards are approved by the
House of Delegates of the American Bar Association. When the
Police Function Standards are completed, the Standards Project
will have reached that conclusion which marks a new frontier
in criminal law.
CONCLUSION
The American Bar Association has been instrumental in
drafting rules of civil and criminal procedure that have now been
adopted, updated from time to time, and placed in use in the
federal courts and in a majority of the state courts.23 5
The Federal Rules Project is a true monument to the Amer-
ican Bar Association. However, in examining the aims, scope,
and purposes of the American Bar Association Project on Stan-
dards of Criminal Justice, legal scholars, judges, lawyers, police,
and the public will be forced to conclude that the Standards have
filled a gap in our criminal law and procedure that was too long
overlooked. Consideration is now being given to the inclusion of
the American Law Institute Model Code of Pre-Arraignment
Procedure as a part of the Standards to finish the project. When
concluded, the American Bar Association and the Institute of
Judicial Administration can say that the adoption of the Stan-
dards represents the finest achievement of the organized bar.
235. 1 W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 9
(1960).
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